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ABSTRACT 
This article critically examines social obligations on Chinese 
collective-owned land. Current social responsibilities on Chinese 
collective-owned land are inadequate, ineffective, and distorted. Ru-
ral property right holders do not owe sufficient social burdens to 
society. As rural land regulators, rural collectives should have the 
authority to regulate and manage agricultural land use. Because of 
the vague and weak identity of rural collectives, collectives have 
limited authority and resources in restricting and regulating rural 
land use rights. As rural landowners, collectives violate their social 
responsibilities by misusing agricultural land and harming society. 
This article argues that for agricultural land, where physical char-
acteristics of the land are better used in farming, the use restriction 
serves as a social obligation that conforms to the physical charac-
ters of the land. Thus, it is justifiable for collectives or the state to 
impose restrictions upon the land use rights of agricultural land, 
especially basic agricultural land—land that is most suitable for 
farming. The restrictions, however, must be imposed according to 
physical characteristics of the land, not according to the identity of 
landowners.  
 
Keyword: social obligations of property rights in China, collective-
owned land, social obligations 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditional libertarians argue that private property’s social func-
tion is to shield it from the power of the public, and to promote per-
sonal autonomy, liberty, security, and economic efficiency.1 A so-
cial norm of private property, as an alternative, views property as a 
social institution, which can and should contribute to society.2 It 
                                                                                                             
 1. HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 40 (2011). 
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 3 
(2000). Qinglan Long, Reinterpreting Chinese Property Law, 19 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 57 (2009).  
 2. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Prop-
erty Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 746 (2009).  
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contrasts with the notion that private property ordinarily triggers in-
dividual rights, not social obligations.3  
A social norm of private property does not come from a partic-
ular theory. It can be found in many property ideas that do not nec-
essarily promote social norms. For example, even the strictest liber-
tarians acknowledge that property should not be used in a way that 
harms neighbors or community.4 From the classical liberal view, so-
cial responsibility plays a necessary role in property rights. How-
ever, this role often only comes into play if something bad happens. 
The law and economics version of this obligation, for example, 
views owners as having responsibilities to their community to solve 
or cure problems like market failures, free riders, and holdouts.5 A 
negative social responsibility of libertarians is demonstrated in An-
glo-American common law to avoid committing a nuisance.6 Anti-
nuisance doctrine asks the owner not to commit a noxious use on his 
property, and the state could abate such use without paying compen-
sation.7 Libertarians also acknowledged there might be “certain in-
trinsic constraints operating within property rights as a result of the 
limitations on permissible appropriation from the commons.”8 John 
Locke, for example, believed that the law of nature entails both neg-
ative obligations and affirmative obligations, which include leaving 
available resource to others, and making surplus resources available 
for others subsistence when they cannot provide for themselves.9  
What are the social obligations of land rights on collective-
owned land in China? What roles do Chinese agricultural collectives 
play in regulating and enforcing social obligations of property rights 
on collective-owned land? Do these social obligations counter 
                                                                                                             
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PROPERTY THEORY 114 (2012). 
 6. Alexander, supra note 2.  
 7. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 225 (2006). 
 8. ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 5.  
 9. Id. at 39. 
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harms or problems and serve the public welfare of society? What 
prevents rural collectives to exercise their regulatory authority? 
What are the problems associated with the social obligations of Chi-
nese property rights in the countryside? 
As rural landowners, Chinese agricultural collectives have au-
thority in regulating land use rights on rural land, such as cultivated 
land preservation, supervising farmers for reasonable use and pro-
tection of the property, and monitoring farmers’ rights to transfer 
their land use rights. However, social obligations imposed upon col-
lective-owned land are inadequate and distorted. Historically, few 
social obligations were imposed on collective-owned land. The col-
lective system created boundless property rights, eliminating prop-
erty users’ basic negative social responsibilities, i.e., that they 
should not use their property in a way that harms their neighbors or 
community. Social duties imposed on collective-owned land were 
distorted. For example, mandatory quotas and fees demonstrated 
that Chinese rural property rights mainly served the state’s interests. 
Land use restrictions imposed on collective-owned land by the state 
turns on the question of who owns the land regardless of the physical 
characteristics, nature of the property, and public welfare.  
Although rural collectives play an essential role in regulating ag-
ricultural land use, their regulatory authorities are abrogated by the 
state. As land regulators, collectives do not adequately exercise their 
regulatory responsibilities on collective-owned land. As landown-
ers, collectives violate their social responsibilities when they use ag-
ricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. The state violates its 
social obligations by abandoning its regulatory responsibilities as 
higher land regulators in China. The state also violates social re-
sponsibilities on collective-owned land by initiating, transferring, or 
contracting agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. In the 
context of China, this article argues that it is justifiable for collec-
tives to regulate the agricultural land use and impose social obliga-
tions on farmers to avoid negative externalities. The state, as a 
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higher entity of landowner and regulator, is justifiable to restrict ag-
ricultural land for agricultural use.  
II. HISTORICAL SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS ON COLLECTIVE-OWNED 
LAND 
A. Social Obligations on Collective-Owned Land from the 1950s to 
1980s  
When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the 
new government confiscated landlords’ lands and houses and allo-
cated them to individual peasants.10 During the brief period of pri-
vate ownership from 1950 to 1952 in rural areas, peasants began to 
exercise independent decision-making about production and sales.11 
In many regions, farmers sold their surpluses not to the state but to 
private parties, who usually would pay up to 40% higher than the 
state.12 This situation occurred out of the expectancy of the Chinese 
Communist Party (or the CCP).13 From that time on, the state au-
thorities started to impose mandatory quotas on the farmers and 
fixed the purchase prices.14 
Before long, agricultural resources were pooled to support the 
state economic development. In 1953, the CCP decided to start the 
collectivization of rural land.15 Under the flag of the “Proletarian 
Socialist Revolution,” three movements were launched. They were 
Mutual Aid Teams, Elementary Agricultural Producers’ Coopera-
tives, and Advanced Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives. 
                                                                                                             
 10. JURGEN DOMES, SOCIALISM IN CHINESE COUNTRYSIDE, RURAL SOCIETAL 
POLICIES IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 10-11 (1980).  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 12. 
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The movements gradually eliminated peasants’ private rural land 
ownership.16 The movement that formed “Socialist Advanced Peo-
ple’s Cooperatives” finally completed the collectivization of rural 
land ownership.17  
At the same time, the first Five-Year Plan was designed for eco-
nomic development for the period of 1953 to 1957.18 Industry and 
heavy industry were paramount to the plan. Peasants had to produce 
a surplus to enable the creation of an industry base “while consump-
tion was to take [the] last place.”19 For example, under the “Socialist 
Advanced People’s Cooperatives” system, mandatory quotas were 
imposed. The income of Cooperatives came from mandatory sales 
to the “public procurement and supply organization.”20 Until the 
early 1980s, the state still “imposed near state monopoly over the 
purchase and marketing of grain, cotton, and other main agricultural 
products and permitted a quasi-segregation system between urban 
and rural residents.”21  
The collectivization of rural landownership served the dual pur-
pose of both producing revenue for urban economic development 
and national socialist development, at the expense of “sacrificing 
rural development and exploiting the peasantry.”22 Agriculture be-
came the primary source of capital when China lacked funds for in-
dustry construction. Agricultural products were exported to ex-
change for construction equipment.23  
 
                                                                                                             
 16. LINA WANG, ZHONGGUO CHENGSHI TUDI CHANQUAN ZHIDU YANJIU 
[STUDIES ON CHINA URBAN LAND PROPERTY RIGHTS] 66-68 (2006).  
 17. PATRICK A. RANDOLPH JR. & LOU JIANBO, CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW 
78 (2000).  
 18. First Five Year Plan (1953-1957), CHINESE POSTERS, https://perma.cc 
/AA2D-T844 (last visited Aug. 8, 2016). See also CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1955 
(E. Stuart Kirby ed. 1956). 
 19. Id. 
 20. RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 17.  
 21. CHUN LIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE SOCIALISM 67 (2006). 
 22. Id. at 66.  
 23. CONTEMPORARY CHINA, supra note 18.  
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After the success of the first Five Year Plan, in 1957, Mao ad-
vocated a more aggressive mobilization of masses, and “greater, 
faster, better, and more economic results.”24 The plan was supposed 
to instill “a sense of communal thinking and value rather than an 
individualistic one.”25 The government promoted an even greater 
scale of agricultural production to make up for the shortage of capi-
tal so that the limited funds could be used for industries, such as state 
defense industry and nuclear capability development.26 This devel-
opmental policy generated three movements, also termed “Three 
Red Banners.”27 They were the “General Line of Socialist Construc-
tion,”28 the “Great Leap Forward,”29 and the “Establishment of Peo-
ple’s Communes.” 
During these processes, rural collectives became more and more 
centralized under state control. They became production tools for 
the state.30 Although collectives had formal rural land ownership, 
they had no right to use it according to their wills. The state deter-
mined how collectives should use the agricultural land, what and 
how much the collectives should produce. The state claimed all farm 
                                                                                                             
 24. DOMES, supra note10, at 22.  
 25. ADRIAN CHAN, CHINESE MARXISM 161 (2003). The policy was counter-
productive and ran afoul of the reality. Peasants were already living a hard-work-
ing and thrifty life; most of them worked 12 to 16 hours per day in the field, but 
still had low living standards. For example, the working conditions were inhu-
mane; because of retardation of the textiles industry, many communes lacked win-
ter cloth. Peasants started to resist communes. They despised the common welfare 
of the communes as work units in the villages, and they divided harvested grain 
among them. DOMES, supra note 10, at 18. JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA’S 
POLITICAL SYSTEM, MODERNIZATION AND TRADITION 102 (7th ed. 2010). LIN, 
supra note 21, at 70. 
 26. CHAN, supra note 25, at 152. This policy demonstrated that a historical 
theme of conflicts between China and the world community dominated Mao and 
his close associates’ agenda, as the conflicts between peasants and landlords had 
been eliminated in the early 1950s.  
 27. DOMES, supra note 10, at 24. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Within the People’s Communes system, collectives became production 
tools for the state. In the beginning, the “production guarantees” were determined 
before harvest. When communes found it impossible to deliver the quantity from 
the surplus, they had to limit the supply of their members to reach the guaranteed 
quota. Margo Rosato-Stevens, Peasant Land Tenure Security in China’s Transi-
tional Economy, 26 B.U. INTL. L.J. 97, 105 (2008). DOMES, supra note 10, at 18.  
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surpluses, “squeezing residual harvest out of villages through the 
state monopoly for purchasing and marketing agricultural products, 
planned low purchase prices, encouraging ‘over quota sales,’ and so 
on.”31 
Besides serving the state’s interests, rural collectives played lit-
tle role in land management and regulating rural land use. Few social 
obligations were imposed on collective-owned land. The system fo-
cused on the totality of production, but ignored the means and indi-
viduality.32 This resulted in the total exhaustion of public property 
and the elimination of millions of peasants’ property.33 For example, 
on the eve of land collectivization, many incidents of wasting agri-
cultural land occurred. There was a rush of building residential 
houses on collective-owned land, even on scarce and good agricul-
tural land.34  
The extreme public ownership resulted in severe negative exter-
nalities, creating boundless property rights, diminishing society 
members’ basic negative duty not to interfere with others and caus-
ing calamities to public goods.35 Without property boundaries, no-
body owed any duty to the neighbors, communities, or society. This 
system was a great contradiction to the socialist ideology, whose 
aim was to promote a greater good of the community. As scholar 
Adrian Chan pointed out: 
[The] Great Leap Forward shows the innate weakness of 
[Mao Zedong Thought] and Chinese Marxism, and proves 
that it was simplistic and utopian to place extreme faith in 
                                                                                                             
 31. Xiaolin Pei, Collective Landownership and Its Role in Rural Industriali-
zation, in DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS: LAND REFORM AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE IN CHINA 237 (Peter Ho ed. 2005) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENTAL 
DILEMMAS].  
 32. The “tragedy of the commons” destroyed both promises and expectations. 
Peasants did not have any incentive or energy to respect collective-owned prop-
erty. They were exhausted and still longing for private land ownership. Collec-
tives did not have any extra energy to enforce social obligations.  
 33. WANG, supra note 16, at 68. Under the People’s Commune regime, al-
most all personal property became collectivized. Peasants only retained clothes, a 
few domestic animals, and some household utensils. DOMES, supra note 10, at 34.  
 34. DOMES, supra note 10.  
 35. ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 5, at 32.  
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the powers of human consciousness to effect social and eco-
nomic changes without scientific or realistic bases, and that 
the CCP leaders were Marxist in rhetoric only.36 
B. Analysis of the Peasants’ Social Obligations 
Historically, massive social burdens imposed on peasants were 
not directly related to their property rights on collective-owned land. 
Peasants had to sell a quota of their output to the state, pay a share 
of agricultural taxes to the state, and meet their monetary obligations 
to villages’ public accumulation and welfare funds.37 Peasants owed 
financial obligations to various levels of governments, from rural 
villages to state governments.38 The term tiliu referred to the peas-
ants’ financial burdens towards village governments.39 In addition 
to official tiliu, other social charges, including labor corvées, were 
also added to the peasants’ burdens.40 Under many circumstances, 
peasants would gain nothing from sales of quotas; they may even be 
in debt when sales of quota were not enough to pay the whole con-
tracted sum.41  
These burdens imposed on peasants were derived from their 
memberships in the collectives.42 In most rural areas of China, 
whether or not peasants fulfilled these burdens decided whether or 
not they were still members in the collectives, and memberships in 
                                                                                                             
 36. CHAN, supra note 25, at 138. The years from 1959 to 1961 was known as 
“Three Lean Years.” Official figures estimated that around 8 million people died 
during the famine after the Great Leap Forward. DREYER, supra note 25, at 103. 
DOMES, supra note 10, at 18. 
 37. Pei, supra note 31. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Xiande Li, Rethinking the Peasant Burden: Evidence from a Chinese Vil-
lage, in RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA: THE NEW AGRICULTURE 
47 (2d ed., Jacob Eyferth, Peter Ho & Eduard B. Vermeer eds. 2004). In the village 
level, the farmers pay three tiliu; in the township level, the farmers pay “five tong-
chou.” Three tiliu and five tongchou cannot exceed 5% of a farmer’s net income. 
In fact, the required payments are larger than 5%. 
 40. Id. at 53. 
 41. Id. at 59. 
 42. SHUQING WANG, ZHONGGUO TUDI ZHENGSHOU FALV ZHIDU YANJIU 
[LEGAL RESEARCH ON LAND ACQUISITIONS OF CHINA] 24 (2012). Valerie Jaffee 
Washburn, Regular Takings or Regulatory Takings?: Land Expropriation in Ru-
ral China, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POLICY J. 71, 78 (2011).  
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turn determined whether they were entitled to obtain any property 
rights.43 Most of these burdens had an indirect relationship with 
peasants’ property rights on collective-owned land and most of these 
obligations served the government’s needs. Although agricultural 
tax might be related to property, the weight of the tax was hefty and 
it had little to do with peasants’ actual farming income.44 All other 
burdens, including water and electricity fees, public accumulation 
funds, and other social charges such as insurance costs, fines in fam-
ily planning, administrative expenses, and education fees, were not 
related to peasants’ property rights on collective-owned land.  
The shortage of funding sources significantly restricted rural 
government’s ability to regulate any property-related activities.45 
Towns and villages were responsible for providing public services, 
social welfare, and necessary infrastructure for rural economic de-
velopment. The three tiliu collected by village committees were as-
signed to local institutions for public accumulation funds, public 
welfare funds, and administrative fees.46 However, due to weak fi-
nancial statuses, rural governments could not accomplish these 
roles. The overstaffing problem among all three levels of govern-
ments drained financial resources. Ultimately, the burdens fell on 
farmers to pay salaries of these staffs.47  
On the other hand, state governments did not take responsibility 
for their role in developing the rural economy, but further drained 
                                                                                                             
 43. Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Fa (农村土地承包法) [Rural Land Contract 
Law] (amended by the Tenth Meeting of the Standing Committee. of the 11th 
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on August 27, 
2009, effective March 1, 2003) [hereinafter Rural Land Contract Law]. Article 
15: “The party undertaking the contracting by households shall be a farmer of the 
economic organizations of the said collectives.” National People’s Congress, Law 
of the People's Republic of China on Land Contract in Rural Areas, available at 
https://perma.cc/QP2Y-6U2V. 
 44. Eventually, the agricultural tax was repealed in 2006. HAN GAO, JITI 
CHANQUAN XIA DE ZHONGGUO NONGDI ZHENGSHOU WENTI YANJIU [STUDIES 
ON CHINESE FARMLAND EXPROPRIATION UNDER THE COLLECTIVE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS] 55 (2009). 
 45. Li, supra note 39, at 64.  
 46. Id. at 52. 
 47. Id. 
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rural financial resources.48 More critically, the redistribution of re-
sources and wealth was moving backward; the regime imposed in-
tentional and unfair redistributions of wealth from poor peasants and 
collectives to city dwellers and state governments.49 Although tra-
ditional law and economics oppose redistribution of wealth for the 
sake of equality of welfare, a more progressive regime expands 
property owners’ social obligations concerning contributing to an 
equal social welfare.50 Chinese state governments, as the highest 
landowners, were profiting at the expense of agricultural collectives 
by taking rural land and transferring it to third parties for much 
higher prices.51 The profits extracted from agricultural collectives 
were not used in rural areas to develop rural economies, but instead, 
were used to fund state government’s operations that primarily ben-
efited urban cores.52 This further exacerbated the dire financial sit-
uations in rural areas and the gap between rural and urban areas 
since rural resources were constantly taken away without any return.  
III. CURRENT SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS ON RURAL COLLECTIVES  
A. The Identity of Rural Collectives Determines Their Limited Reg-
ulatory Roles 
After the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the tragic “Three 
Year Natural Disasters,” the central leadership started to rebuild ru-
ral collectives. Considering that China could not regress back to the 
farmers’ private landownership, Mao and the center administration 
drafted the “Sixty Rules” and decentralized collectives to three lev-
els: People’s Commune, Production Brigade, and Production 
Team.53 Production teams were the most important collectives and 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 5.  
 51. Gregory M. Stein, Acquiring Land Use Rights in Today’s China: A Snap-
shot from on the Ground, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 36 (2006).  
 52. Id. at 38.  
 53. Jacob Eyferth, Peter Ho & Eduard B. Vermeer, The Opening-Up of 
China’s Countryside, in RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA: THE 
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were the principal owners and managers of accounting units of ag-
ricultural land.54  
Although the “Sixty Rules” decentralized rural collectives, the 
state and the party still firmly controlled agricultural collectives and 
enforced the state and the party’s policies. For example, state gov-
ernments appointed team leaders of production teams who made de-
cisions regarding farm operations.55 Every production brigade was 
stationed an administrative office and a communist party branch, 
representing “the state in executing government policies such as 
grain procurement.”56 Under the “Sixty Rules,” although the central 
leadership did grant some freedom to farmers, allowing them to own 
and manage some small parcels of “household plots,” and “home-
steads,” state governments still controlled the transfer of land rights 
and made decisions regarding crop cultivation and their prices.  
The “Sixty Rules” almost governed for two decades. Agricul-
tural collectives in modern China are the remnant of People’s Com-
munes, which were established in 1958 and disbanded in the mid-
1980s.57 After further de-collectivization, people’s communes be-
came townships or towns, and production brigades were changed 
                                                                                                             
NEW AGRICULTURE, supra note 39. Peter Ho, Introduction: The Chicken of Insti-
tutions or the Egg of Reforms?, in DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS, supra note 31, at 
27. Geoffrey Korff, The Village, and the City: Law, Property, and Economic De-
velopment in Rural China, 35 SYRACUSE J. INTL. L. & COM. 399, 407 (2008). Mao 
preferred the ownership vested in production brigades. However, moderate mem-
bers of the party suggested that ownership should be vested in production teams 
because farmers were more responsible for the land under the direct supervision 
of production teams. In September 1962, the National People’s Congress issued 
the Sixty Rules and identified production teams as the primary responsibility units 
and owners of the land. 
 54. RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 17, at 76. Rosato-Stevens, supra note 
30.  
 55. For example, team leaders of “production team[s]” made decisions about 
farm production and state governments appointed rural community members. 
Xiaobo Zhan et al., Local Governance and Public Goods Provision in Rural 
China (International Food Policy Research Institute, EPTD Discussion Paper No. 
93, 2002).  
 56. Id.  
 57. Eyferth, Ho & Vermeer, supra note 53, at 1. PETER HO, INSTITUTIONS IN 
TRANSITION: LAND OWNERSHIP, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN 
CHINA 28 (2005). 
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into administrative villages, and production teams turned into natu-
ral villages or villagers’ groups.58  
Article 10 of the Land Administration Law provides the follow-
ing:  
Land owned by peasant collectives that belong lawfully to 
peasant collectives of a village shall be operated and man-
aged by collective economic organizations of the village or 
by villagers’ committees. Land already owned by different 
peasant collectives that belong to two or more different col-
lective economic organizations in the village shall be oper-
ated and managed by the rural collective economic organi-
zations in the village or by villagers’ groups. Land already 
owned by a peasant collective of a township (town) shall be 
operated and managed by the rural collective economic or-
ganization of the township (town).59 
However, it is unclear if these entities that manage and adminis-
ter collective-owned land are equal to collectives that own land. In 
2007, article 60 of the Property Rights Law further provided that 
these entities that manage and administer collective-owned land 
should exercise the ownership on behalf of collectives.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id.  
 59. Tudi Guanli Fa (土地管理法) [Land Administration Law] (amended by 
11th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress 
of the People’s Republic of China, August 28, 2004, effective Jan. 1, 1999). Na-
tional People’s Congress, Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, available at https://perma.cc/F3JA-NYZN [hereinafter Land Administra-
tion Law]. 
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 The diagrams of collectives and entities that represent collec-
tives are as follows:  
 
Table 1. 
 
Land owned by                                                  Shall be operated and managed by           
                                                                   LAL,60 Art. 10 
 
 
exercise ownership on 
its behalf 
 
2007 Real Property   
Law, Art. 60 
 
Table 2. 
 
Land owned by                                                  Shall be operated and managed by  
                                                                          LAL, Art. 10 
 
 
exercise ownership on its 
behalf  
 
2007 Real Property Law, 
Art. 60 
 
Table 3. 
 
Land owned by                                                  Shall be operated and managed by  
                                                                          LAL, Art. 10 
 
 
exercise ownership on 
its behalf  
 
2007 Real Property 
Law, Art. 60 
 
                                                                                                             
 60. In this article, LAL is the abbreviation of the Land Administration Law.  
Farmers’ collective of a 
village 
(Former production 
team) 
Collective economic 
organizations of the 
village or by villag-
ers committees 
Two or more different 
collective economic or-
ganizations in the village 
(Former production bri-
gades) 
The rural collective 
economic organiza-
tions in the village 
or by villagers’ 
groups 
A peasant collective of 
a township (town) 
(Former communes) 
The rural collective 
economic organization 
of the township (town) 
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Although rural collectives are important institutions in Chinese 
society, the vagueness of rural collectives has resulted in their lim-
ited role in regulating rural land use and problematic boundaries of 
rural land use rights. Collectives can mean old production teams, 
which are essentially natural villages, or old brigades, which are ad-
ministrative villages, or old people's communes, which are town-
ships.61 Even local officials are often unclear as to which level col-
lectives are the right owners.62  
The results of this ambiguity are at least two-fold: one, because 
of this deliberate ambiguity, collectives can hardly establish or ex-
ercise their authority to regulate or manage the agricultural land as 
owners and regulators. Two, no valid legal entity can represent the 
interests of collectives. Collectives cannot adequately defend their 
ownership when the state expropriates collective-owned land. This 
result is what the state has intended, which further demonstrates that 
the state is the highest owner and arbiter of the land.63  
For example, in a small town named Nanhai, neither the county 
government nor the town government was ready to take the respon-
sibilities to regulate and manage a small rural river within its area. 
Although the county-level government agencies had authority to 
monitor and administer the use of the river, they did not take their 
responsibilities. The town government, as a grassroots bureaucracy 
of the local government, did not have the resources to manage the 
river. In fact, nine rivers within the town over an area of 171.3 
square kilometers were left unmanaged and unregulated.64 
                                                                                                             
 61. Peter Ho, Introduction to DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS, supra note 31, at 
27. Korff, supra note 53, at 407. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
Property Seizure in China: Politics, Law and Protest 24 (Jun. 21, 2004), available 
at https://perma.cc/8HE9-Z3RU. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Shitong Qiao, Governing the Post-Socialist Transitional Commons: A 
Case from Rural China, YALE LAW SCHOOL STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP PAPERS, 
2012, https://perma.cc/NH9F-7K39. 
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Rural collectives have been weak and submissive to the state and 
the party.65 In Maoist China, the state and the party firmly controlled 
the personnel of rural collectives; they appointed a party branch and 
team leaders for every collective. For example, in the past, produc-
tion teams were the most influential collectives. However, they were 
too weak of an institution to represent their members’ interests.66 
Although they had formal land ownership, they lacked real power 
over land, and they frequently lost their rights against local govern-
ments and higher collectives.67  
After decollectivization, the situation is the same. Natural vil-
lages are not independent and are subordinate to state governments. 
Their ownership rests in higher administrative levels such as admin-
istrative villages, towns, or county governments and above. For ex-
ample, a 1997 survey of the Central Policy Research Office revealed 
that administrative villages through villagers’ committees and vil-
lagers’ delegates (rather than natural villages) leased 60.5% of the 
land.68  
No strong institutions represent the interests of villagers or farm-
ers. The villagers committee, as the legal representative for a farm-
ers’ collective of a village exercising collective landownership and 
manage collective-owned land, has become “an extension of state 
governance.”69 This reality is no surprise because local governments 
and party authorities control these village committees and their lead-
ers, although they are supposed to be elected by villagers or farm-
ers.70 Township or town governments, as a grassroots bureaucracy, 
                                                                                                             
 65. Eva Pils, Waste No Land: Property, Dignity and Growth in Urbanizing 
China, 11 APLJP 1, 12 (2010). 
 66. Ho, supra note 61, at 17.  
 67. Daniel W. Bromley, Property Rights and Land in Ex-Socialist States: 
Lessons of Transition for China, in DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS, supra note 31, 
at 45. 
 68. Id.  
 69. YAN ZHANG, GOVERNING THE COMMONS IN CHINA (2017).  
 70. Nick R. Smith, Negotiating the Power to Plan: Spatial Planning and Prop-
erty Rights in Peri-Urban China (Apr. 15, 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. paper, Har-
vard University), https://perma.cc/D42L-CU49. Rosato-Stevens, supra note 30.  
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primarily function as an extension of local governments. Township 
officials are primarily state cadres.71  
B. Current Social Obligations on Rural Collectives Are Subordi-
nate to the State Government’s Authority 
1. Registration 
Chinese laws require rural collectives to register their land own-
ership within county governments.72 Registration is a prerogative 
power of state governments because it creates land ownership as 
well as land use rights.73 In reality, however, state governments do 
not properly implement registration.74 
Registration power clearly demonstrates the instrumentality of 
rural property rights in China: serving the state’s interests. State 
governments can choose not to register some property rights and re-
fuse to issue certificates. For example, the law does not protect the 
“small property room,” which occurs when farmers or collectives 
build commercial residential houses on the collective-owned land 
and sell to nonmembers of collectives.75  
                                                                                                             
 71. Emily T. Yeh, Property Relations in Tibet Since De-Collectivisation and 
the Question of “Fuzziness,” 2 CONSERV. SOC. 108-31 (2004). 
 72. RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 17, at 81, 159. Joyce Palomar, Land 
Tenure as a Market Stimulator in China, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL. L. 7, 18 
(2002). According to the 1989 Land Registration Rules, “[a]gricultural collectives 
must apply to local land administration at the county level for the registration of 
their land ownership.” The 2007 Land Registration Rules have now replaced the 
1989 Rules. Tudi Dengji Banfa (土地登记办法) [Land Registration Rules] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Land Resources, Dec. 30, 2007, effective Feb. 1, 
2008). Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 11: “Land owned by peasant 
collectives shall be registered with and recorded by people’s governments at the 
county level, which shall, upon verification, issue certificates to confirm the own-
ership of such land.”  
 73. Land Administration Law, supra note 59.  
 74. Palomar, supra note 72, at 18. Wuquan Fa Art. 10 (物权法) [Property 
Rights Law] (promulgated by the Fifth Session of the Tenth National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China, March 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 
2007). The Property Rights Law reiterated to unify the registration system. 
 75. According to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, “small 
property room” (or Xiao Chan Quan Fang refers) to commodity housing that is 
built upon collective-owned land. The small property room does not have housing 
certificate that is issued by the state government; rather, township or town gov-
ernment issues the certificate. Wang, infra note 76. 
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Central state governments employ many mechanisms to abolish 
this phenomenon, including refusing to register land rights or refus-
ing to issue land rights certificate.76 In 2008, the central government 
issued a directive irritating the policy prohibiting urban residents 
from buying houses built on collective-owned land.77 Although 
townships (or towns) issue ownership certificate for small property 
room, the state government does not issue ownership certificate on 
small property room.78 Because the “small property room” poten-
tially violates the nature of agricultural land and leads to misuse, it 
is reasonable for central governments to prohibit such use. However, 
serious doubts arise because the use restriction is imposed when col-
lectives own the land and such restriction is not imposed when the 
state becomes the landowner. This phenomenon apparently protects 
the state’s monopoly over rural land, keeping the value of rural res-
idential land cheap and enjoying the profits of non-agricultural land 
uses.79 
2. Dispute Resolution 
The Land Administration Law provides that towns or townships 
have authority in resolving disputes.80 However, this law hardly 
                                                                                                             
 76. The small property room does not have any housing certificate issued by 
the state government. Rather, the township or the town government issues the 
certificate. The law does not protect registration by town or village governments. 
It is very crucial for farmers or collectives to register their land rights in the state 
governments. Qi Wang, zhujianbu: xiao chan quan fang bu keneng hefahua zhili 
jiang yuelaiyue yanli [The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development: Small 
Property Room Cannot Be Legalized—It Should Be Treated Harsher], SHANGHAI 
SECURITY NEWSPAPER, May 24, 2010, https://perma.cc/AP2Z-BQEB. 
 77. Kai Wang, Whatever-ism with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Nascent 
Recognition of Private Property Rights and Its Political Ramifications, 6 E. ASIA 
L. REV. 43, 88 (2011). 
 78. Wang, supra note 76.  
 79. Central governments are in the same shoes with local governments when 
it comes to maintaining the state’s monopoly upon land benefits. Kai Wang, 
Whatever-ism with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Nascent Recognition of Pri-
vate Property Rights and Its Political Ramifications, 6 E. ASIA L. REV. 43, 88 
(2011). 
 80. “Disputes between individuals or between individuals and units shall be 
handled by people’s governments at [all levels, including] the township level or 
at or above the county level.” Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 16. 
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grants any actual authority to rural collectives. In the first place, 
town (or township level) government officials are mainly state ca-
dres. Besides, the authority of the town is mostly advisory; accord-
ing to the law, state governments are the final entities in resolving 
disputes between parties.81  
3. Land Regulations 
Compared to regulating collective land ownership, agricultural 
collectives have more authority in land use rights on collective-
owned land. However, most of the authorities are subordinate to or 
abrogated by state governments.  
a) Land Use Planning 
Land use planning is a power and tool that belongs to state gov-
ernments. In more developed rural areas, different local state gov-
ernments compete to control the rural village’s planning process to 
expand their territories.82 According to the Land Administration 
Law, local governments shall make both comprehensive and annual 
land use plans.83 Lower-level government land use plans must be 
reviewed and approved by higher-level governments.84  
                                                                                                             
 81. Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 16: “Disputes over owner-
ship of land or the right to the use of land shall be solved through consultation 
between the parties. If such consultation fails, the disputes shall be handled by the 
people’s government.” 
 82. Smith, supra note 70.  
 83. RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 17, at 328. Land Administration Law, 
supra note 59. The annual land use plan is the method “through which decisions 
are made as to the release of land for land use rights in the next following year.” 
Article 17 of Land Administration Law provides that people’s governments at all 
levels shall manage to compile comprehensive plans for land uses following “the 
national economic and social development program, requirements of national land 
consolidation and resources and environmental protection, land supply capacity 
and the requirements of various construction projects.” The State Council shall 
determine the validity term of the comprehensive plans for land use. The imple-
mentation rules set the duration of the comprehensive plan for 15 years. Tudi 
Guanli Fa Shishi Tiaoli Art. 13 (土地管理法实施条例) [The Implementation 
Rules of Land Administration Law] (amended by the State Council, Dec. 27, 
1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999).  
 84. Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 21.  
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The Land Administration Law regulates three different types of 
land: agricultural land, construction land, and unused land.85 Agri-
cultural land protection is the primary purpose of making general 
land use plans.86 According to article 6 of the 1998 Basic Farmland 
Protection Regulations, state governments bear the responsibility of 
protecting agricultural land.87 The State Council and its agricultural 
administrative department shall be responsible for the management 
and protection of basic farmland throughout the country. According 
to the provisions of this regulation, local governments at or above 
the county level and agricultural administrative departments shall be 
responsible for the protection of basic farmland management work 
in their respective administrative areas. However, when state gov-
ernments are burdened with the responsibility of protecting farm-
land, they have more leeway not to enforce it.  
The regulations describe the authorities of agricultural collec-
tives in very few articles, and all of these few powers are granted to 
town or township governments—the grass-root level governments 
whose fundamental duty is to serve state governments.88  
                                                                                                             
 85. Id., Art. 4. 
 86. The overall land use plan is employed to balance agricultural and non-
agricultural land use. Mark T. Kremzner, Managing Urban Land in China: The 
Emerging Legal Framework and Its Role in Development, 7 PAC. RIM L. & 
POLICY J. 611, 644 (1998). The average area of farmland in China per capita is 
only a third of the world average. Ho, supra note 61, at 8. HO, supra note 57, at 8. 
RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 17, at 26. 
 87. This function is carried out by state governments, or township (town) 
governments, which are subordinate to state governments. Land Administration 
Law, supra note 59, Art. 31. Jiben Tong Tian Baohu Tiaoli (基本农田保护条) 
[Basic Farmland Protection Regulations] (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 
27, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Basic Farmland Protection Regula-
tions].  
 88. For example, Article 11 of the Basic Farmland Protection Regulation pro-
vides that farmland protection zones should be established within towns. The 
County level government land administration department and its agricultural de-
partment should draw the boundaries of agricultural protection zones. Townships 
(or towns) should be responsible for the protection of basic farmland within their 
respective administrative areas. Also, article 18 states that townships (or towns) 
can reclaim the farmland when the party under agricultural contract abandons the 
land for two years. Basic Farmland Protection Regulations, supra note 87, Arts. 
11, 18.  
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b) Granting Contractual Land Use Rights on Agricultural 
Land 
In present-day China, most agricultural collective-owned land is 
used under the Agricultural Contract Responsibility System. Ac-
cording to article 12 of the 2009 Rural Land Contract Law, collec-
tives have the right to grant contractual land use rights for agricul-
tural purposes.89 Farmers who are members of the collectives have 
the right to undertake rural land contracts with their collectives.90 
While agricultural collectives still hold the ownership of the land, 
farmers have a land use right for thirty years under the contract.91 
State governments exercise their supervisory power upon transfer of 
land use rights on agricultural land through their registration author-
ity.92 Although the contractual land use right becomes effective 
since the signing date of a contract, when farmers do not register the 
contract, the land use right to agricultural land does not become ef-
fective to third parties with good faith.93  
 
 
                                                                                                             
 89. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Art. 12. The entities of collec-
tives that exercise the right to grant contractual land use rights follow the Land 
Administration Law.  
 90. Id., Art. 5; see also Art. 19. The contractual process is like this: members 
of collectives must elect a group in charge of the contract work. The group, then, 
must publish the projected contract by laws and regulations. Then, village mem-
bers pass the contract project through discussion. Two-thirds or more of the mem-
bers of the collective must approve the contract plan. Then, the contract is con-
cluded and publicly implemented. Stein, supra note 51, at 46. See also Gregory 
M. Stein, Commercial Leasing in China: An Overview, 8 CORNELL REAL EST. 
REV. 26 (2010);  
 91. RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 17, at 117. 
 92. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Art. 23. Thus, when farmers 
transfer land use rights to farmland, they shall apply to county level governments 
for registration. 
 93. Id., Arts. 22, 38. Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jingyingquan Zheng Guanli 
Banfa (农村土地承包经营权证管理办法) [Measures of the People’s Republic 
of China for the Administration of the Certificates of the Right to Contracted 
Management of Rural Land (2003)], reprinted in LAND LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
277 (Law Press China 2011). 
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c) Supervisory Authority of Collectives under the Agricultural 
Contract 
Agricultural agreements regulate farm uses and serve as a rudi-
mentary form of zoning. The Rural Land Contract Law obligates the 
contract holder to use the contracted land for agricultural or other 
similarly prescribed purposes and not to commit waste. Farmers un-
der agricultural contract must bear three burdens: first, they must 
sustain the agricultural use of the contracted land and not use the 
land for nonagricultural purposes without approval;94 second, they 
must use the land rationally and protect the land, and not cause per-
manent damage to the land; third, they must conform to other laws 
and regulations. These restrictions are crucial upon the scope of col-
lective land ownership, as well as farmers’ rights in the land when 
they enter into agricultural contracts.95  
Collectives serve a limited supervisory role to ensure that farm-
ers use the land for agricultural purposes.96 According to the law, 
collectives should exercise supervision over the reasonable use and 
protection of the land by the farmers.97 Collectives have the author-
ity to supervise and ensure that the agricultural land is used for farm-
ing and cultivating purposes.98 The law requires collectives to: 
[provide] the contractor services in respect of production, 
technology, and information, etc. as agreed upon in the con-
tract; [and carry] out the overall plan for land use worked out 
by the people’s government of the county or township 
(town) and [make] arrangements for the construction of ag-
ricultural infrastructure within its own collective economic 
                                                                                                             
 94. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Arts. 8, 17, 60. 
 95. Id., Art. 18.  
 96. Korff, supra note 53, at 416.  
 97. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Arts. 13, 19.  
 98. Benjamin W. James, Expanding the Gap: How the Rural Property System 
Exacerbates China’s Urban-Rural Gap, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 451, 468 (2007). 
Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 14: “Land collectively owned by 
farmers shall be contracted out to be run by members of the collective economic 
organizations for use in crop farming, forestry, animal husbandry, and fisheries 
production under a term of 30 years” (emphasis added). Robin Dean & Tobias 
Damm-Luhr, A Current Review of Chinese Land-Use Law and Policy: A “Break-
through” in Rural Reform?, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POLICY J. 121, 129 (2010).  
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organization.99  
Collectives are empowered to stop “the contractor from damag-
ing the contracted land and agricultural resources.”100 Collectives 
can terminate the contract and take back the land if the contractor 
leaves the cultivated land lay waste for two years.101 Collectives 
have limited authority to supervise a farmer’s right to circulate his 
or her land use right. When a farmer transfers his or her rights to a 
third party, he or she must get approval from the collective.102  
Even under the agricultural lease system, rural collectives are 
under the control of the state. Administrative villages are the lessors 
of the majority of the agricultural land under the supervision of the 
township or town.103 The law reserves administrative villages (or 
villagers’ committees) and villagers’ delegates the rights to redis-
tribute land according to changes in household size,104 but state gov-
ernments control these institutions. 
Although both collectives and state governments have the power 
to stop illegal land use, collectives do not have robust measures to 
impose particular punishments upon contractors who harm the farm-
land. Only state governments have the authority to punish illegal ac-
tions.105 Collectives have the right to compensation when the con-
tract undertaking party permanently damages the land.106 Collec-
tives do not have an independent right to reclaim their agricultural 
                                                                                                             
 99. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Art. 14. 
 100. Id. Arts. 13, 60. 
 101. Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 37. 
 102. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Art. 37: “Where a transfer is 
adopted for circulation, the matter shall be subject to consent by the party giving 
out the contract; and where subcontract, lease, exchange or other means is adopted 
for circulation, the matter shall be reported to the party giving out the contract for 
the record.”  
 103. Ho, supra note 61, at 31. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Art. 60. County level govern-
ments (not collectives) shall impose punishment when the contractors use the ag-
ricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. Land Administration Law, supra 
note 59, Art. 67. 
 106. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Art. 60. “The party that lets the 
contract has right to compensation when the contract undertaking party perma-
nently damages the agricultural land.” 
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land when the state condemns the land for non-agricultural construc-
tion projects and the land is left unused or wasted.107 
For example, article 37 of the Land Administration Law pro-
vides that state governments are empowered to revoke land use 
rights when the construction unit fails to start construction for two 
successive years. When the land used to belong to peasant collec-
tives, state governments should return the land to the original rural 
collectives for re-cultivation.108 However, the article does not man-
datorily require the state to reclaim the appropriated rural land, and 
it does not grant petition rights to farmers. For example, in Zhejiang 
Province, the local government condemned a piece of agricultural 
land and granted land use rights to a local company. The company 
wasted the land. Three years passed and no construction work was 
completed. The local government did not take any action to stop 
such wasteful action. A group of farmers sued the government, re-
questing the wasted agricultural land be returned to them. The gov-
ernment argued these farmers did not have any right to sue them 
because they were no longer the right-holder of the land; only the 
original rural collectives had such right. The local intermediate court 
took the case. However, it held that farmers did not have the right to 
sue.109 
The Rural Land Contract Law removes many of the collectives’ 
restriction powers regarding the circulation of land. The law gives 
much freedom to farmers’ right to dispose of the land.110 The law 
requires only notification to collectives when farmers subcontract, 
                                                                                                             
 107. Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 37.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Yan Xu, Zhejiang Haining Shiwuhu Nongmi Zhuanggao Zhengfu Wei 
Shouhui Xianzhi Tudi,X [Government Does Not Reclaim Wasted Land, Zhejiang 
Haining City Fifteen Farmers Sued The Government], CHINESE YOUTH 
NEWSPAPER (Aug. 8, 2006), https://perma.cc/3SXX-LBHE.  
 110. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Art. 34: “The contractor shall 
have the right to make his own decision, according to law, on whether to circulate 
the right to land contractual management and on the means by which to circulate 
the right.”  
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lease, or exchange land whereas it requires the agreement of collec-
tives when farmers transfer land.111 This policy creates loopholes 
because farmers can simply subcontract, lease, or exchange land use 
right whereas they keep the land use right.112  
During the term of a contract, the adjustment of rural contract by 
collectives is very limited. Collectives may not take back the con-
tracted land during the term of a contract.113 They have the authority 
to adjust the management of agricultural contract, but their authority 
is limited and subject to the approval of the township governments 
and county governments. When a farmer’s family moves and settles 
down in a small town, the farmer can reserve his or her land use right 
or circulate the right.114 Collectives can legally adjust the manage-
ment of a contract in particular circumstances such as natural disas-
ters and when farmers move to an urban area and become city resi-
dents. The readjustment matter must be approved by no less than 
two-thirds of the collectives’ members, and villagers’ representative 
must report to relevant administrative agencies of town governments 
and county governments for approval.115  
                                                                                                             
 111. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Art. 37. 
 112. According to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, the 
Land Administration Law was revised because (1) it reiterates the policy that 
“guarantees a land lease of 30 years no change;” and (2) “it curtails the power of 
the villagers’ committee through the stipulation that leased land can be redistrib-
uted only if the approval of two-thirds of the villagers’ congress or delegates has 
been obtained.” Daniel W. Bromley, Property Rights and Land in Ex-Socialist 
States: Lessons of Transition for China, in DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS, supra 
note 31, at 41. 
 113. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Art. 26. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id., Art. 27: 
When during the term of contract, such special circumstances as natural 
calamities that seriously damaged the contracted land make it necessary 
to properly readjust the arable land or grasslands contracted by individ-
ual peasant households, the matter shall be subject to consent by not less 
than two-thirds of the members of the villagers assembly of the collective 
economic organization concerned or of the villagers’ representatives and 
shall be reported for approval to the competent administrative depart-
ments for agriculture, etc. under the relevant township (town) people’s 
government and the people’s government at the county level . . . . 
Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 14. 
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However, collectives should have more authority to adjust rural 
land contract during the term of a contract. From the collectives’ 
perspective, farmland adjustment is another aspect of regulating ru-
ral land use rights. Reasonable land adjustments allow collectives to 
either rearrange land that is returned willingly by farmers under the 
contract or reclaim back land when farmers cannot do the farm-
ing.116 Under either circumstance, collectives can allocate land to 
other farmers who are able to manage farms more efficiently.117  
Land adjustment due to the migration of rural labors has been a 
practical issue in China.118 Because the agricultural reforms have 
freed a substantial portion of rural labor from farmland, millions of 
farmers have left their allocated agricultural land and look for non-
agricultural employment opportunities.119 A 1997 survey revealed 
that about 9.7% of 214 million active rural households were em-
ployed entirely outside the agricultural sector.120 In 2001, 220,000 
people left their farmlands in Jianli County, Hubei Province, which 
                                                                                                             
 116. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Art. 26:  
If during the term of the contract, the whole family of the contractor 
moves into a city divided into districts and his rural residence registration 
is changed to non-rural residence registration, he shall turn his contracted 
arable land or grassland back to the party giving out the contract. If the 
contractor fails to turn it back, the party giving out the contract may take 
back the contracted arable land or grassland. 
Although the Land Administration Law provides that collectives can take back 
contracted farmland that is wasted by contractors, they must wait for two years. 
Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 37. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Even fewer younger farmers are willing to continue farming. Because the 
profit of agriculture is low, many younger farmers have abandoned farming—
their older generations employment—and look for a better life in urban areas. 
Roughly 7.3% of farmers’ children born in the 1980s are willing to farm, whereas 
only 3.8% of farmers’ children born in the 1990s are ready to plant. In this situa-
tion, coupled with a premature and incomplete rural land rental market, insuffi-
ciency has emerged, as these households cannot adjust such changes between land 
and labor. Zhang Xiaoge, Zhengdi Chaiqian Boji Quanguo Baifenzi Shiliu Jiating, 
[16% of Chinese Households are Involved in Condemnation and Demolition], 
RADIO FREE ASIA (Oct. 28, 2013), https://perma.cc/AFV2-VMTB. Scott Rozelle, 
Loren Brandt, Li Guo & Jikun Huang, Land Tenure in China: Facts, Fictions and 
Issues, in DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS, supra note 31, at 134. 
 119. Eyferth, Ho & Vermeer, supra note 53, at 4. Wang, supra note 79, at 66. 
 120. Id.  
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accounted 49% of the total rural force.121 They vacated around a 
third of the county’s total arable land.122 However, these farmers did 
not give away their land use rights; instead, they kept the land “as 
security in case of unemployment, disability, or retirement,” or sub-
lease to other farmers.123 The current law permits farmers to retain 
their contractual land use right if they move to a small town.124 On 
the one hand, this reality might cause a higher scale of agricultural 
use of the land “when the subcontracted land is leased to fewer farm-
ers and the promotion of agricultural efficiency.”125 On the other 
hand, it has an adverse impact because it is common that these farm-
ers would rather let the land go wasted or unpopulated than give it 
back to the collectives.126 It is evident that this will harm society as 
a whole, in which case both the state and the collectives should im-
pose a certain amount of social responsibility on the farmers. Under 
these circumstances, collectives should readjust the land to other 
farmers who would efficiently farm the land.  
Because rural China has a long-term egalitarian culture, collec-
tives face intense social pressure from the rural community to pro-
mote an equal allocation of land, which causes frequent readjust-
ments of cropland.127 Collective ownership with periodic realloca-
tions of land ensures relatively equitable household access to land 
resources.128 In reality, adjustments have been found most fre-
quently and comprehensively in those regions where land is rela-
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 122. Id.  
 123. Id. WANG, supra note 16, at 79.  
 124. Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 43, Art. 26.  
 125. Wang, supra note 79, at 66. 
 126. WANG, supra note 16, at 77.  
 127. HO, supra note 57, at 10.  
 128. Tony Banks, Property Rights Reform in Pastoral Areas: Dilemmas on the 
Road to the Household Ranch, in DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS, supra note 31, at 
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tively scarce, and off-farm work opportunities are limited, thus con-
firming the role of social insurance.129 Research based on Sichuan 
Province showed that regions with high population pressure demand 
an equal distribution of resources, stringent land regulations, and a 
stronger commitment to shared interests.130 Despite the central au-
thorities and the liberal economist belief that land tenure security is 
critical to China’s economic growth, it is unexpected that the major-
ity of farmers supported redistributions of cropland because of 
changes in family size. In a 1997 survey conducted on 271 villagers, 
about 80% of them had been readjusted since the introduction of the 
lease system, within which 66% had been readjusted twice.131 The 
survey revealed that 62.8% of the sample villages still supported re-
distribution of farmland.132 Another study of 800 households 
showed that 62% of the participants were in favor of a policy that 
reassigned land among families “in response to changes in the com-
position of their families.”133 
The real force behind decisions of readjustment of land use 
rights comes from the state.134 While most decisions are rooted in 
villages, townships or higher-level state governments are the final 
decision makers. More significantly, because of the hierarchical na-
ture of the governmental system in China, collectives are subordi-
nate and under the control of state governments. As the state ap-
points most leaders of collectives, these leaders number one concern 
is to satisfy their higher-level officials because this affects their 
“prospect for promotion.”135 The primary responsibilities of village 
leaders include: first, “collecting taxes and levying fees;” second, 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. The reality in the China rural area is that over 70% of registered rural 
residents represent a hidden unemployment in the countryside. Eyferth, Ho & 
Vermeer, supra note 53, at 14. Banks, supra note 31, at 264. 
 130. HO, supra note 57, at 10.  
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“implementing family planning;” and third, “fulfilling grain pro-
curement quotas.”136 The state or the party “has the power to remove 
cadres who do not succeed in fulfilling the state’s interest, and may 
be able to prevent fired officials from taking advantage of the perks 
and privileges that otherwise accrue to past and present village lead-
ership.”137  
d) Social Obligations of Rural Homestead Housing Rights 
Rural homestead housing rights are “generally allocated [to 
farmers] without payment to households by village collectives.”138 
This is an exception to the default rule that collective-owned land 
must be used for agricultural use.139 Thus, although the use of the 
land is for non-agricultural use, the land still belongs to agricultural 
collectives.140 These rights have no time limitation.141 The farmers 
can occupy and use their homestead without fees as long as they 
wish.142 This right is also inheritable.143 Rural homestead housing 
rights are of a social welfare character. Only members of economic 
collectives are entitled to apply to have such rights.144 As early as 
1963, the Central Committee of the CCP issued “A Supplement No-
tice about Members Homestead Problems,” which provided that: 
“[A homestead belonging to members of the people’s communes] 
belongs to production teams collectively, and the homestead is pro-
hibited from being transferred. It shall be used by members for a 
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 138. Weiguo Wang, Land Use Rights: Legal Perspectives and Pitfalls for 
Land Reform, in DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS, supra note 31, at 68.  
 139. Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 43.  
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long term and unchanged. Production team should protect members’ 
land use rights.”145  
The Land Administration Law provides that the land used for 
rural residents’ homesteads must be planned for construction pur-
poses under the general town or village land use plans.146 Rural res-
idents must apply to agricultural collectives and get approval from 
both villages or town and county or city governments.147 The state 
also is strict about the “one household, one homestead” policy. Ad-
ditionally, total homestead sizes applied should not exceed stand-
ards set by provinces, or cities.148  
According to the language of the law, the social obligations of 
this land use right have two dimensions. First, the transferability of 
the right is limited: like any other collective-owned land, farmers 
cannot sell or lease the collective-owned land.149 If they rent or sell 
their house on the land, they cannot apply for a new homestead af-
terward.150 The purpose of this rule is to restrict farmers’ speculation 
of homestead.151 In addition, “[residents] must make good use of the 
original homestead or empty land” and must use the land for housing 
purposes.152 Section 52 of the “1995 Provisions on Land Ownership 
and Land Use rights” provided that “if the family abandons the 
house for two successive years or fails to restore the house within 
                                                                                                             
 145. WANG, supra note 16 at 100.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Arts. 44, 62. Guotu Ziyuanbu 
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dure of farmland conversion.  
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 150. Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 62. 
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two years after its destruction, agricultural collectives may reclaim 
the property.”153  
As a practical matter, many farmers have migrated to towns and 
cities and abandoned and deserted their housing land.154 On the one 
hand, this housing land remains unproductive. On the other hand, 
other villages or collectives are in urgent demand for additional land 
for housing due to rapid population growth.155 The next problem is 
that many homestead constructions violate both zoning laws and 
regulations and maximum space requirements. These buildings ei-
ther occupy farmland that should be used for farming, or they exceed 
the maximum space requirements. Although central governments 
have realized this issue, it is hard to solve. For example, about 
172,974 acres of cultivated land have been used to build houses 
since 1986, and the number is increasing rapidly.156 In addition, it is 
common for farmers who have built houses on their homestead to 
sell them to urban dwellers, who cannot afford the urban homes dur-
ing the housing boom but want to own real property.157  
C. Social Obligations Imposed Upon Collective Land Ownership 
Are Distorted 
Collectives are legally restrained owners, and all of these re-
strictions come from the party and state governments. Collectives 
can only hold their landownership for agricultural purposes. 
Collectives cannot transfer, lease, or mortgage their land for non-
agricultural uses.158 With limited exceptions, collectives cannot 
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 158. Land Administration Law, supra note 59, Art. 63. The article prohibits 
the transfer of land use right of collective land for non-agricultural purposes, with 
the exception that the transfer of such interests in the context of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, merger situations.  
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change agricultural use unless they surrender their landownership to 
the state.159  
This land use restriction impinges entirely upon the question of 
who owns or who uses the land, regardless of the physical charac-
teristics and nature of the land.160 For instance, if farmers want to 
alter the utilization of collective-owned land, the change of use has 
to be approved by at least two-thirds of members of the agricultural 
economic group and then approved by county governments.161 
However, when state governments want to change agricultural land 
for non-agricultural purposes and eventually condemn the land, 
there is no such restriction. 
Collective ownership has frequently been transferred into state 
ownership, almost at the will of the state. State governments do not 
regulate and impose social obligations on collective-owned land. On 
the contrary, the state initiates agricultural land conversion that en-
ables the state to use agricultural land for any other purposes, as long 
as state governments condemn collective-owned land and then 
transfer collective ownership to the state.162 This situation is far-
reaching in the circumstance of governmental takings. This situation 
often happens when a suburban neighboring city has sprawled, cre-
ating a need or desire for rural land. Due to rapid urban expansion, 
local governments have expropriated many former collective-
owned lands for public non-agricultural purposes and then sold the 
land use rights to third parties for a much higher price. The weakness 
of collectives is the central reason that they cannot fight against the 
state governmental takings. There are some legal restrictions to the 
condemnation procedures, but as a practical matter, these processes 
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will not prevent condemnation nor affect the legality of condemna-
tion itself. These legal restrictions themselves clearly prove that col-
lectives have no say when state governments decide to condemn 
their land.163  
The three exceptions that do not need transferring of collective 
ownership to the state are: (1) using agricultural land for township 
and village enterprises, or using agricultural land use right as stock 
share with individuals or units to set up businesses or joint ven-
tures,164 (2) using agricultural land for public facilities and public 
welfare services,165 (3) using the land for building houses for rural 
household.166 Even under these limited exceptions, collectives still 
have to apply to local governments for approval.167 This approval 
process is a significant barrier to rural economic development such 
as township and village enterprises.168 The state has held hostility 
towards rural collectives for a long-time. China’s top planners 
wanted to protect state-owned enterprises at the sacrifice of devel-
opment of township and village enterprises.169 The state thought that 
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only state industries could efficiently use the limited resources in 
China, not township and village enterprises.170 
However, township and village enterprises offer substantial fi-
nancial resources to villages and towns. They take advantage of the 
abundance of cheap labor in the countryside, make more affordable 
products, and significantly decrease the burdens of farmers. With 
the support of township and village enterprises, villages and towns 
can operate more efficiently; they can provide more public services 
and general welfare to farmers.171 The statuses of villages and town-
ships would be strengthened because they would have more money 
and incentive to protect themselves against the state governments.172 
In reality, however, because of the lack of financial resources, al-
most all the financial burdens fall upon the farmers, which makes 
poor rural areas poorer, causing social unrest and a disincentive to 
farming.173 
IV. SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON COLLECTIVE-
OWNED LAND 
As land regulators, rural collectives should have the authority to 
regulate and manage agricultural land use. Collectives should im-
pose restrictions to curb or counter the negative social impact of 
property. It is justified for collectives or the state to impose re-
strictions upon the land use rights of farmland, especially basic ag-
ricultural land—the land that is most suitable for farming. The use 
restrictions must be imposed according to the physical characteris-
tics of the land, not according to the owner of the land.  
For example, in some less developed areas, village or township 
authorities frequently surcharge farmers when agricultural land use 
rights are transferred, and this has provoked substantial controversy. 
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Yet if the fees are used to counter the negative impact of transferring 
land use rights, it is justifiable. The imposed fees are legitimate un-
der two circumstances: first, when the purchase price would be too 
low or unreasonable between private parties; second, when land use 
rights are transferred to outsiders without any knowledge of or abil-
ity to farm, or if a farmer transfers land use rights without cultivating 
the land. The fees is reasonable as a fine to deter current farmers 
from randomly transferring their land use rights.  
In reality, however, the inadequacy of both social obligations 
and their enforcement create severe concerns for rural development, 
in particular for the environment. Farmers and collectives violate 
their social responsibility by not using land according to its nature 
and by putting the environment at risk. In reality, it is common for 
farmers to use the agricultural land irrationally. The land use re-
strictions are blurred, and no restrictions exist at the local level to 
control agricultural production.174 Neither collectives nor local gov-
ernments have the incentive, time, or resources to enforce legal re-
strictions on the agricultural activities of farmers. On the contrary, 
they want farmers to produce as many products as possible, as this 
will increase revenue.175 As a result, farmers with livestock are al-
lowed to overgraze, which significantly diminishes the quality of 
land in rural areas.176 Significant amounts of chemical fertilizers are 
used, and water is polluted.177 Farmers are given no immediate di-
rections about how to greenly and efficiently use their land and not 
pollute the environment.178  
Collectives violate their social obligations in rural areas and 
waste agricultural land. Since the entity of collective is vague or va-
cant, cadres of collectives often replace members of collectives and 
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make contract decisions.179 Cadres, who are also members of col-
lectives, would either conveniently sign agricultural contracts with 
collectives or would forcibly occupy or buy land contracts from cur-
rent farmers. As the value of farmland use is low, both the cadres 
and contracting farmers have incentives not to use agricultural land 
for agricultural purposes.  
For example, in the Shuangfeng village of Guangdong province, 
cadres of the village illegally and secretly converted more than 
3,292 acres of collective-owned forestlands, including other villag-
ers’ contracted agricultural lands, into luxury cemeteries.180 Trees 
were cut down, and lands were cleared and cut into squares accord-
ing to different bosses.181 Disguised as a buyer, a journalist inter-
viewed one “boss.”182 When told by the manager that each square 
meter cost 100 yuan and that the journalist could buy as many square 
meters as desired, the reporter asked, “Will the government examine 
this [illegal land use of collective-owned land]?” The boss replied, 
“You don't need to worry about this. There is no problem with it. 
The village [cadre] has solutions.” The journalist then asked how the 
bosses got the land, and the manager told him that the community 
collective contracted the land to them.183 Every year, these manag-
ers paid fees to the village and then they sold these properties as 
cemeteries.184 Then, the journalist interviewed the cadre of the com-
munity, but the cadre denied all allegations, saying the collective did 
not sell land to people to build cemeteries.185 When the journalist 
asked why there were so many cemeteries found, the cadres said: 
“the forest is too far away from the village and is hard to walk from 
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here, and it is very hard to manage.”186 The journalist also inter-
viewed the city department of civil affairs, but the staff told the re-
porter that they did not know about this.187 He told the reporter that 
a few individual villagers might have built these so-called cemeter-
ies.188 The reporter questioned him about his brother who managed 
one of the cemeteries (as tipped off by one villager).189 The cadre 
replied that his brother was not managing the cemeteries, just one 
temple.190 However, during the journalist’s interview, there was no 
visible temple found.191  
In another example, in Tongzhou City, Yongshun town, 
Jiaowang village, a cadre illegally occupied agricultural land for res-
idential purposes.192 He also was breeding Tibetan Mastiff dogs for 
commercial purposes.193 The cadre received the lease of the land 
from one villager and paid over 1 million yuan.194 The agricultural 
land belonged to the village collective and should have been used 
for apple planting.195 After the cadre had started construction, vil-
lagers made complaints to the town government.196 The town gov-
ernment planned to have a tractor demolish the construction, but it 
stopped after only destroying part of the building.197 Then, the cadre 
resumed construction.198 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Chinese rural collectives as both landowners and land regulators 
should bear certain social obligations. In reality, however, Chinese 
rural land rights are devoid of social obligations. Current social ob-
ligations on collective-owned land are inadequate, ineffective, and 
distorted. The collective system creates boundless property rights, 
eliminating property users’ minimum negative social responsibili-
ties that they should not use their property in a way that harms neigh-
bors or community. The vague and weak status of rural collectives 
explains their limited roles in regulating rural property rights on the 
collective-owned land. The land use restrictions on collective-
owned land impinge entirely upon the question of who owns the 
land rather than physical characteristics of the land.  
As higher-level regulators, the state should impose restrictions 
on rural right-holders to use the agricultural land properly and rea-
sonably to accommodate agricultural land’s physical characteristics, 
such as its nature and location and to serve social welfare. As regu-
lators, the state does not fulfill its regulatory responsibilities in en-
forcing social obligations on collective-owned land. As higher-level 
landowners, the state violates its social responsibilities by harming 
agricultural land. Lack of boundaries of the state powers causes the 
state to be extremely flexible in encroaching upon rural property 
rights whenever it wants to. 
This article argues that for agricultural land, where physical 
characteristics of the land are better used for farming, the use re-
striction serves as a social obligation that conforms to physical char-
acteristics of the land. It is justifiable for collectives or state govern-
ments to impose social obligations on rural land because collective-
owned land is predominately suitable for agricultural use. The re-
strictions, however, must be imposed according to physical charac-
teristics of the land, not according to the identity of owners of the 
land.  
 
